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REVISITING THE ROLE OF THE FUTURE
IN ACCOUNTING REFORM
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Abstract
Overlooked in accounting-reform debate emanating from recent financial
reporting scandals is the role of forward-looking disclosure inaugurated in the late 1970s
and expanded throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Debate centered on whether accounting
concepts developed during this period were too rule-bound.

An SEC study largely

resolved this debate by characterizing US GAAP as a mix of rules and principles
embedded in an objectives-based accounting system.

The SEC expressed a slight

preference for principles over rules in future accounting standard-setting. Some see this
resolution as transformative.

This Article considers how it may disguise a false

dichotomy likely providing false catharsis. Underappreciated are the terms of a debate
intense in the 1960s and 1970s but quiescent amid modernity’s preoccupation with the
future: the reliability of forward-looking disclosure. This Article revisits that debate and
the regime’s contributions to financial-fraud risk, showing how contemporary
accounting’s role has been recast from providing credible numerical history to quixotic
narrative prognosis due to pressures from the information age, digitization era and
modern finance theory.

It is too late and unrealistic to repeal forward-looking

disclosure, but short-sighted to overlook its contributions to systemic financialmisstatement risk.
Keywords: accounting theory, accounting reform, forward-looking disclosure,
projections, digitization, information, modernity, culture, future, rules-based, principlesbased, code-based, objectives-based, natural language, false dichotomies, fairly presents,
historical cost, fair value, cash accounting, accrual accounting, narrative financial
disclosure, continuous disclosure system, transparency, early warning system, modern
finance theory, presentiation.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debates in accounting reform ignited by sizable financial frauds
overlooked the role of forward-looking disclosure, which this Article revisits. The
framework for debating diagnosis and reform was based on false dichotomies arising
from a tendency to blame failures on structures rather than attitudes.1 The frauds were not
due to whether accounting concepts are embedded in a rules-based framework rather than
a principles-based framework and had little do with whether there is a difference between
complying with accounting concepts and presenting financial information fairly.
Deeper difficulties reside in ravenous appetites for speed and transparency stoked
by digitization.2 Traditional accounting is incapable of sating these desires.
Contemporary pressures from digitization and information-hunger force a system
designed to provide primarily numerical histories into one needing to provide narrative
prognosis. The frauds likely were more proximately caused by demand for information
about the future, which simply does not exist. Forward-looking statements possess
intrinsic risk of exaggeration, the core of fraud, and hence disappointment, its
manifestation.
Pursuing the balance in this appetite-capacity mix is more promising than
haggling about rules versus principles or accounting-complianceversus fair -presentation,
the false dichotomies that dominated public discourse in frauds’ wake. An important
aspect of this mix is the balance between accounting as numerical history and accounting
as narrative prognosis.3
Part I shows how two inter-related debates engendered by recent accounting
frauds met dead-ends. One concerned whether compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) facilitates financial statements providing a fair
presentation or whether departing from GAAP is necessary. This hinged, in turn, upon
1

See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631
(1981) (outlining process of moving from assigning responsibilities not to individuals or
groups of people but instead using a systems-based approach to organizational behavior).
2

See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERK. TECH. L.J. 793,
812 (1999) (“The near-complete digitization of data collection, manipulation, and
dissemination over the past thirty years has ushered in what many regard as the
transparency revolution”).
3

The theme evokes an old joke about the economist seen searching a parking lot under a
street light. Asked what he is doing, the economist says he is looking for his car keys.
Prodded as to where he lost them, he replies, “way over there.” So why are you looking
here, he’s asked. Because the light is better here, he says. Substitute economist for
accounting-reformer, and the joke applies to recent discussion of accounting reform.
3

whether GAAP is so rules-based (as opposed to principles-based)as to impair its capacity
to deliver financial statements providing a fair presentation.
By reviewing evolution of GAAP from a living natural language into a system
supplemented by formal-code, the discussion first suggests that GAAP’s qualities do not
prevent it from providing a fair presentation and, by reviewing the mixed foundations of
GAAP in both rules and principles, confirms that GAAP has this capacity. Accordingly,
the discussion shows that these debates are beside the point. The debated issues likely
had little or nothing to do with the accounting frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Pursuing overlooked factors contributing to these episodes, the next two Parts
consider accounting’s traditional function as numerical history and its increasing call to
service as narrative prognosis. Part II provides perspectives on basic accounting theory
and concepts, showing accounting’s essential character as numerical history epitomized
in the balance sheet and income statement. It explains how contemporary debates in
accounting practice deemphasize accounting as numerical history to enlist it in more
ambitious functions, instancing pressure towards fair-value not historical-cost accounting
and cash-flow statement data instead of accrual accounting. It includes a modest
proposal for contrast: to improve accounting, abandon the conceit of reporting single
precise figures for earnings and owners’ equity in favor of reporting faithful ranges for
these concepts.
Part III extends this story of accounting’s transformation from numerical history
to narrative prognosis by explaining the wide variety of circumstances when narrative
information is necessary or appropriate as a component of financial reporting. It shows
how this vehicle has been used to provide forward-looking information and argues that
this process is more likely to create temptations for aggressive or fraudulent accounting
than a format of accounting as numerical history. Despite these cautionary views,
moreover, this Part shows relentless moves to prognostication in financial reporting,
epitomized by newly-sanctioned continuous disclosure concepts and auditor disclosure
concerning future financial statement reliability. These comport with a broader cultural
preoccupation with the future. For financial reporting, these manifestations risk retarding
accounting quality, shown in a penultimate section to be modern finance theory’s central
contribution to modern accounting.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the daunting character of its implications.
Narrative prognosis may be essential to a rational system of financial reporting. But
optimizing its balance with numerical history is critical. An imbalance likely contributed
more to the late 1990s/early 2000s frauds than accounting’s code-qualities or rulesrigidity. Although finding the balance will be elusive, the search will enrich
understanding. It can also provide a blueprint for reforming the forward-looking
disclosure system along more cautious lines.
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I. FALSE DICHOTOMIES IN POWER TALK
According to many, a chief culprit in the accounting scandals of the late 1990s
and early 2000s was accounting’s rule-based rigidity, sacrificing its principles-based
texture.4 A tentative solution to this assignment of blame revived a faded idea requiring
not only complying with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) but presenting
a fair presentation of financial results and condition.5 The diagnosis and cure both
disguise more profoundly important phenomena. Reviewing the discussion’s terms
shows much ado about the wrong questions, and the ultimate but underappreciated
discovery of this misdirection.
A. “Fairly Presents” versus GAAP or Both?
The standard form of audit report in the United States expresses an opinion as to
whether an examined set of financial statements fairly presents a company’s financial
position, results of operation, and cash flows, in conformity with GAAP.6 Two issues and
their relation arise. The issues are what is “GAAP” and what does “fairly presents”
mean. The relational questions are: is it possible to meet one by meeting the other (say
complying with GAAP constituting a fair presentation) and/or does meeting one imply
not meeting the other (for example, does a fair presentation necessarily entail overriding
GAAP?).
4

E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 108(d) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15
U.S.C. ____ (directing SEC to study GAAP’s rules-versus-principles basis); HARVEY
PITT, SEC CHAIRMAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS (FASB guidance has "developed based on rules, and not on broad
principles," and calling instead for principles to "evolve to become general and principlebased, instead of encyclopedic and rule-based, principles”); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD.:
PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING, NO. 107205 (Oct. 2002)
(proposal to adopt a principles-based accounting system); SENATE REPORT NO. 107-205,
at 13 (2002) (expressing concern about rule-approach to accounting matters); see also
Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New
Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2003); Anthony J. [sic],
Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 161-62 (2003); Matthew A. Melone,
United States Accounting Standards: Rules or Principles? The Devil Is Not in the Details,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161 (2004) (accepting premise as true, though arguing that the
cure does not reside in shifting from a rules-based to a standards-based system).
5

Financial “condition” is the label favored by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to designate the relationship among assets, liabilities and owners’ equity as
depicted on a balance sheet. Compare infra notes 20 & 21.

6

Financial “position” is the label favored by the Financial Accounting Principles Board
(FASB) to designate the relationship among assets, liabilities and owners’ equity as
depicted on a balance sheet. Compare infra notes 20 & 21.
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1. What is GAAP? — GAAP can be described as natural language, as code, or
both. The latter possibility reveals a preliminary false dichotomy: it is in fact both,
though this is often overlooked.
— GAAP as Natural Living Language. Generally accepted accounting principles
traditionally were those concepts of financial reporting in common use. The concepts
constituted a natural living language.7 The resulting system was akin to the common law,
one that evolves with custom and usage rather than fixed by code.8 As with the common
law, generally accepted accounting used natural language to apply general concepts to
particular facts.9 As a natural living language, accounting is grammar recognized as
official through general acceptance, a bottom-up approach, not ordained by an official
body backed by legal force, a top-down approach.10
Accounting’s traditional character as natural language produced multiple
designations for like concepts and variable meanings for similar expressions. Examples
endure and appear in how its nomenclature is replete with synonyms. Take the following
clusters of terms that for a business entity usually have identical meanings: (1): book
value, owners’ equity and net worth; (2) earnings, profit and net income; and (3) accounts
payable, payables, current obligations, and current liabilities.11 The term “results of
operations” is akin to net income, earnings or profits. Even fixed assets go by various
terms, including long-term assets; long-lived assets; or property, plant and equipment; the
latter often shortened to plant.
The virtue of this natural-language quality is capacity for nuance and tailoring to
particular situations from abstract fluid categories. Net income and earnings may usefully
7

See Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing, 7 INDIAN
ACCOUNTING REVIEW (2003), reprinted in THE ICFAI JOURNAL OF AUDIT PRACTICE,
www.icfairpress.org (2004) (also available from SSRN.COM, June 16, 2003) [hereinafter
Sunder, Rethinking the Structure]. In this context, natural living language denotes a
system of semiotic communication in which uses define meanings through an endless
evolutionary process, contrasted with a view of an idiom of fixed or inherent meaning.
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe tras. 2d ed. 1967).
8

See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OX. U.
COMM. L. J. 155 (2003); Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part
II), 3 OX. U. COMM. L. J. 1 (2003).
9

See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS
JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND SERIES 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
10

IN

Sunder, Rethinking the Structure, supra note 7, at 5.

11

See ROBERT N. ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (2004)
[hereinafter, ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES].
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be distinguished for a specific business, fitting usually-synonymous concepts to a
particular context. The adage that accounting is the language of business is rooted in
these natural-language origins, where language mediates and maps context. Accounting
emerged as financial grammar whose linguistics influenced the behavior and decisionmaking of information consumers. These qualities can facilitate communication,
providing a vocabulary that, through usage, improves a manager’s ability to explain and a
user’s ability to interpret information.
Natural language presents limits. Synonyms, for example, have different
significations to different users, producing exchanges in which two people can hold
different meanings. A manager may attempt to distinguish net income from earnings but
a shareholder may not appreciate the distinction. The result can be misunderstandings,
and sub-optimal capital allocation. Synonyms bearing slightly different meanings can
slow decision-making, and create inefficiencies in markets where accounting plays a role.
Consumers of accounting information can be predisposed to understand terms in certain
ways. Sharpening and unifying definitions using unique terms can enhance the mediation
to promote optimal interpretation and decisions.12 This possibility creates appeal for
accounting codification.
— GAAP as Code. Appeals for codification of generally accepted accounting
concepts arose in the 1930s. Perceived failures in the grammar of accounting were
blamed, in part, for 1929’s stock market crash, along with the financial bubble of the
preceding years and the Great Depression that ensued. That decade’s reforms (led by the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) deliberately attempted
to thwart accounting’s character as a living natural language.13
A top-down approach was sought, using formal bodies of accounting authorities.
From 1939 to 1959, the Committee on Accounting Procedure promulgated accounting’s
gospel, followed from 1959 to 1973 by the Accounting Principles Board. These
accounting leaders articulated accounting concepts using bulletins and opinions,
promulgations bearing interpretive qualities of leadership not mandates. As a result, these
early pronouncements never fully penetrated the natural language of accounting and
never gained the widespread acceptance that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) had hoped since the 1930s that formal accounting pronouncements would
achieve.14
To close on this quest, in 1973 the SEC created the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) to articulate formal accounting doctrine that would be deemed
See AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter, RIAHIBELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY], at 304-305.
12

13

See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (rev. ed. 1995)
[hereinafter SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET], at 48-49.
14

See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 551-53.
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generally accepted by fiat. To facilitate this, FASB was anointed with powers broader
than its predecessors. It was structured to involve the accounting profession directly in
its activities, useful as a way to integrate the concept of general acceptance of accounting
as a natural language into the formal promulgation process.15 The result was more
effective than those of FASB’s predecessors, a successful top-down approach to
accounting. In fact, FASB so succeeded in rendering generally accepted accounting a
code-based system that many believed it solved one problem and created another:
accounting gospel according to FASB became “an excuse for CPAs to abandon their
judgment.”16
Accounting concepts sanctioned as generally accepted by an authoritative body
provide codification. FASB’s code-setting has more affinities with legislative or statutory
directives than with common law evolution. GAAP is founded upon FASB’s seven
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts, supplemented by nearly 150 Statements of
Financial Accounting Standards, as well as thousands of other detailed interpretations and
technical bulletins. As more akin to legislation, FASB’s accounting is formal language
often prescribing accounting rules with excruciating particularity, especially in its
interpretations and bulletins.
This specificity appears in such simple contexts as defining basic concepts known
to generally accepted accounting’s natural language for at least five centuries. FASB
provides precise definitions for the terms assets, liabilities, owners’ equity, revenue and
expenses.17 Scores of other concepts are likewise treated as technical tools. Complexities
arise in this attempt to tame a natural language, raising questions such as whether gains
and losses on the sale of property, plant and equipment are part of income or not, and
how a wide variety of other transactions should be accounted for, as by running them
through the income statement or recording them directly on the balance sheet as changes
in owners’ equity.18 FASB proffers definitive answers to such questions, but the
questions are intractable.

15

16

Sunder, Rethinking the Structure, supra note 7, at 7.
Id.

17

FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
(SFAC) 1; see LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND
AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter, CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY
ACCOUNTING], at 500 ff. (glossary entries defining these concepts both in general terms
and formal FASB terms)
18 CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING,
ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING COMPREHENSIVE INCOME.

supra note 17, ch. 7; see, e.g., FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 130,
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— A Preliminary False Dichotomy. The intractability of many accounting
questions renders FASB’s codification of generally accepted accounting concepts
necessarily partial. It can be neither comprehensive in scope nor exhaustive in its
treatments. In fact, despite FASB’s leadership, GAAP remains rooted in numerous
sources, not articulated in a single code. The United States Supreme Court has noted that
as many as 19 different sources constituting GAAP could control an accounting issue,
variously providing conflicting solutions to identical situations.19
The choice between natural language and code reveals a preliminary false
dichotomy. Continuing the legal parallel, it is as if legislatures alone could pronounce
law with finitude, dispensing with the need to interpret and apply statutesin part icular
contexts, as done in a common-law system, first by practicing lawyers and sometimes
ultimately by judges. Even the most ambitious codification movements in law never
achieved such absolutism.20
Even with FASB’s partial codification, for example, basic terms can bear openended meanings. Consider various terms used to designate the balance sheet, which
include the statement of position and the statement of condition.21 FASB prefers the term
statement of position while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prefers the

19

Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995) (Kennedy, J.)
(lamenting that "there are 19 different GAAP sources, any number of which might present
conflicting treatments of a particular accounting question"). These include FASB
Statements, Interpretations, Technical Bulletins, Implementation Guides; Accounting
Research Bulletins; Accounting Principles Board Opinions; AICPA Statements of
Position, Accounting Guides, Practice Bulletins, Accounting Interpretations and Issue
Papers; SEC Rules and Regulations; and Emerging Issues Task Force Abstracts, Minutes
and Issue Summaries.
20

E.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191 (1994). Codification is the systematic integration and expression of a body of
knowledge in a single compendium. In law, this is process is often presented as an
alternative to common law; in practice, this vision is functionally unachievable. The
tradition dates to the Code Napoleon, includes codes developed by Jeremy Bentham and
David Dudley Field, restatements promulgated by the American Law Institute, various
Congressional bodies of law such as bankruptcy and tax and—in all states but Louisiana,
itself a product of the Code Napoleon—the UCC. The UCC is probably the most
successful codification effort, but even its crisp terms depend on judicial interpretation
through application of principles. See infra text accompanying notes 47 to 48 (discussing
legal positivism versus modern legal theory).
21

Notice the use of these apparently interchangeable terms in the first two paragraphs of
this Part I, supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.

9

term statement of condition.22 The marketplace still calls it a balance sheet. However
denominated, this document is a record of the cost of measurable resources not used up,
arrayed against obligations of liability-claimants and owners. It is not intended to reveal
financial status, whether denominated as condition, position or other such term.
Calling the balance sheet a statement of condition is almost certainly misleading,
and even statement of position may fail adequately to express its limits. (Statement of
circumstance is closer to reality.) Balance sheet—the term that emerged from
accounting’s origins in natural language to reflect claims commanded balanced with
claims owed23—is more faithful to its capacity than FASB’s or the SEC’s terms.
However the document is denominated, these limits on the balance sheet and on formal
efforts to ordain accounting concepts by fiat relate to the meaning of the concept “fairly
presents.”
2. What is “Fairly Presents”? — The term fairly presents is not defined by law in
the United States nor in authoritative accounting literature.24 This reticence echoes the
old-fashioned sense of accounting as natural language. But the concept entered the
vocabulary as part of the formal securities regulatory process, as formal code-like legal
articulation rather than as natural living language.25 Yet even using this approach, the
reticence to define it reflects a sensibility familiar to the common law, of leaving to
professional judgment the ultim
ate application of general concepts to specific situations.
The meaning of “fairly presents” depends on what a system of financial reporting
is designed to depict. Meeting the view may mean tracking assets, liabilities, owners’
equity, revenues and expenses using the foundational objectives and purposes of
accounting, whether these exercises are animated by general acceptance or articulated,
code-like, by FASB or other bodies.

22

Compare FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT
CONCEPTS (SFAC) 1___ with SEC Regulation S-X, § ___.

OF

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING

23

See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (1998) (explaining
derivation of concepts of debit and credit used in bookkeeping to kindred Italian words,
debitore and creditore, which mean literally debtor and creditor).

THE

24

Compare AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, THE MEANING OF
“PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES” IN THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS NO. 69 (1992).
25

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics and Cash: An Essay on the
True and Fair View, 28 N. C .J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 893 (2003) (tracing concept’s
history).
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The result of applying these exercises consistently should reliably mirror external
business activity. When this occurs, the result should “present fairly,” representing
economic reality. But accounting concepts are tools, not truths. Judgment is necessary to
determine that their application in particular settings produces faithful measures of
economic reality.
Accounting concepts are generalizations—no matter how detailed their
specification—and applying them is particularization. A code can declare that an asset is
a resource not used up but deciding whether an investment in a new technology is such a
resource, and therefore an asset, requires judgment.
With any statement of accounting concepts, there will be numerous potentially
correct reporting methods. A requirement to “present fairly” can therefore be met in a
variety of ways. The requirement captures a range of fidelity to economic reality.
Complying with applicable accounting concepts, however these are ordained, may not be
enough. Economic realities are measured by the instruments of accounting but the
common law mind-set rightly doubts its ability to craft ex ante directives universally
applicable to reflect them faithfully.
This reality produced an apparent dichotomy between complying with GAAP on
the one hand and providing a fair presentation on the other. It famously appeared—and
then was neglected for nearly two generations—in Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in
United States v. Simon.26 In reviewing an accountant’s potential liability for fraudulent
financial reporting, Judge Friendly said that compliance with GAAP does not necessarily
satisfy the fairly-presents requirement.27
At trial, the accountant sought a jury instruction stating that he could not be guilty
of fraud unless, under GAAP, the financial statements he certified did not fairly present
the company’s financial condition and results.28 Rejecting this proposed instruction,
Judge Friendly instead defined the issue as whether the financial statements, taken as a
whole, fairly present the company’s financial condition and results.29
26

425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).

27

Id. at 805-06. For a current re-assessment of the case, see James D. Cox, Reforming
the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting
Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 319-20 (2003).
28

The proposed jury instruction further qualified that liability could only be found if, in
addition, any departure from GAAP involved willful disregard and the accountant knew
the financials were false and held an intent to deceive. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d
796, ___.
29

If they do not, then the issue is whether the accountant acted in good faith. Proving
compliance with GAAP evidences good faith, but is not conclusive. Relevant factors
include the authoritative quality of the sources relied on in forming the judgment about
what GAAP required.
11

The case thus distinguishes between compliance with GAAP and achieving a fair
presentation, and elevates the latter to primary importance. If complying with GAAP
does not produce a fair presentation, then compliance with GAAP is subordinated to
promoting a fair presentation. In such cases, GAAP must be overridden.
The apparent duality between compliance with GAAP and fair presentation
continued (and continues) to appear in the language contained in standard audit reports.
But the case was never generalized in federal securities litigation or enforcement to
achieve enduring legal significance.30 In accounting and auditing practice, moreover, it
was essentially assumed that compliance with GAAP meant a fair presentation. This
assumption could be accurate if GAAP’s generality is sufficiently capacious to permit
fair tailoring for application to particular contexts.
3. Falsity in the Dichotomy —When accounting scandals erupted in the early
2000s, accounting authorities returned to Judge Friendly’s desuetude distinction. Perhaps
fair presentation does differ from complying with GAAP and should be made primary. If
so, then it will sometimes not be possible for an auditor to give the standard form of
opinion, that financial statements both comply with GAAP and fairly present a
company’s financial performance and condition. If so, a quiet revolution occurred.
Consider a post-scandal SEC pronouncement addressing the relationship between
compliance with GAAP and fairly presents. The pronouncement accompanied
explanation of corporate-officer certification requirements imposed under the SarbanesOxley Act. These require top officers to attest that financial statements do both, comply
with GAAP and fairly present. The SEC, reviving Judge Friendly’s long-ignored
approach, privileged fairly presents over GAAP.
The SEC specified that its regulations require certification that “the overall
financial disclosure fairly presents, in all material respects, the company's financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows.”31 The SEC clarified that the certification
is not limited to an attestation that the financial statements accord with GAAP,
emphasizing instead the broader requirement of “overall material accuracy and
completeness."32
Furthermore, it declared: “Presenting financial information in

30

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B. U. L. REV. 301, ___ (2004) [hereinafter, Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform] (reporting inability to find any cases relying upon this ruling in
United States v. Simon). Relics of the case appear in two SEC releases concerning its
enforcement actions. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., SEC RELEASE NO. 34-30532 (March 31,
1992); Edison Schools, Inc., SEC RELEASE NO. 34-45925 (May 14, 2002).
31

See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
COMPANIES’ QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002).
32

Id.
12

conformity with generally accepted accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy
obligations under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”33
The SEC by fiat thus declares dead a practice norm that compliance with GAAP
is both necessary and sufficient to achieve a fair presentation. As a matter of logic, this
SEC position should mean that the standard form of audit letter should be changed: it is
possible (even likely) for GAAP-compliance to be inadequate to reach a fair presentation.
If so, the latter is to be privileged and the audit report would have to say the statements
fairly present, whether or not in compliance with GAAP. Yet this revision to the
standard audit report has not been made. Instead, debate moved to a different plane,
concerning the congruence of GAAP with the fairly presents requirement. That is, it
became a question of GAAP’s capacity to yield a fair presentation.
B. Rules versus Principles or Both?
Revelation in the early 2000s of numerous spectacular accounting frauds spawned
a seemingly-vigorous debate in contemporary accounting policy. The debate centered on
whether GAAP had become too rule-bound in FASB’s top-down mandates, losing its
principles-orientation associated with its natural-language origins that would congeal
with the fairly presents requirement. If too rule-bound, compliance with GAAP would
impair the possibility of meeting the fairly-presents obligation. Virtually all participants
in the debate assumed that GAAP was exceedingly rules-based.34 They could point to
three forces creating this perceived condition.

33

Id., n. 55. Thus the SEC takes the position that a "fair presentation" is not about results
alone but also about:
the selection of appropriate accounting policies, proper application of
appropriate accounting policies, disclosure of financial information that is
informative and reasonably reflects the underlying transactions and events
and the inclusion of any additional disclosure necessary to provide
investors with a materially accurate and complete picture of an issuer's
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Id.

34

See supra note 4. For a refreshing exception in the legal literature, see William W.
Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1045-52 (2003)
[hereinafter Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents] (providing a four-part
rebuttal to the assertion, and also noting that the auditing profession preferred the existing
conception of a rules-based approach though urged changes in the rules); see also
Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS
(March 2003) (explaining how principles emerge when promulgated according to an
underlying conceptual framework).
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First, FASB’s codification mandate and resulting efforts made it a creator of rules
rather than principles. And this was of course exactly what it was told to do. Second,
auditors might prefer a rule to a principle when this relieves them of the anxiety (and
legal risks) of exercising judgment.35 Letters are easier than spirits to defend, and
auditors played a major role in shaping FASB’s promulgations.36 Third, some opined
that as business transactions grow more sophisticated and complex, accounting concepts
follow suit through dense complex rules not broad general principles.37
Most participants in this debate proceeded with little examination of the
assumption that FASB produced rules not principles and that resulting GAAP was too
heavily rules-based, sacrificing its principles-based, natural-language qualities.38 In part
because it is impossible to prove that any accounting system is more rules-based or
principles-based, commentators compared US GAAP to other accounting systems.39
Most saw evidence of looser, principles-based accounting systems used in other
countries. But even this exercise proves little, and evidence of the opposite interpretation
was essentially ignored.40
35

36

Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, supra note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 15.

37

For example, FASB and others point to its rules on derivative financial instruments as
illustrating the obsessively detailed rules based approach, though FASB notes this quality
largely reflects the complexity and variety of the underlying instruments to be accounted
for. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
(SFAS) __ : ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVES (___ 200_).
38

On the other hand, academic research in accounting supported the view that using
principles rather than rules can promote conservative accounting and discourage
aggressive accounting. E.g., Andrew D. Cuccia, Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson,
The Ability of Professional Standards to Mitigate Aggressive Reporting, 70 THE
ACCOUNTING REVIEW 227 (1995); Dennis R. Beresford, It’s Time to Simplify Accounting
Standards, 187 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY 65 (1999).
39

E.g., Frederick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. &
COMM. REG. 967, 972 (2003). In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley itself invites comparing US
GAAP with UK GAAP. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 108(d) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. ____.
40

Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Might Just Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 915, 976 (2003) (surveying a leading
three-volume treatise, published by Palgrave and sponsored by KPMG, detailing the
major accounting principles of 19 countries plus the EU and IASC and finding that in
total pages devoted to these systems, a proxy for prescriptive density, US GAAP comes
in fifth place—after the UK, Germany, Japan and France). Furthermore, rule
characteristics develop by accretion of authoritative interpretation of principles, making
relatively older systems such as US GAAP appear more rule-bound than relatively new
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The dominant assumption of rules-domination, accompanied by these positive
explanations for this condition, were set against a normative background concerning
whether what FASB wrought was optimal. At a practical level, compared to general
accounting principles, detailed accounting rules may be more difficult to use, costly to
implement and—most poignantly—allow for structuring transactions to meet literal
requirements while ignoring intent and spirit (read, to commit fraud). Advocates of a
principles-based approach argued that it facilitates superior reporting and—most to
present purpose—facilitates achieving a fair presentation when complying with GAAP.
A practical solution urgently was needed. A crisis loomed: if the widely-held
assumption of GAAP as rules-excessive were true, then GAAP had to be reinvented—
post haste—and the standard form of audit letter rewritten. After all, complying with that
kind of GAAP would frequently mean absence of a fair presentation. If a fair
presentation is privileged, then a rules-based GAAP makes itself functionally irrelevant.
Fortunately, despite the weight of rhetoric, the unexamined assumption turned out to be
false.
1. Classifications —What are rules and principles and how do they differ?41
Consider some automobile-driving concepts. Examples of driving rules are no-rightturn-on-red, no U-turns, red-means-stop and green-means-go, use turn signals, stop for
school buses and wear seat belts.42 Principles are yellow-signals-caution, drive as a
reasonable, prudent person and exercise due care in relation to driving conditions one
faces. A rational system of driving-licensing and operation involves both sorts of
directives. It is neither rules-based nor principles-based.
In accounting, rules begin with: a set of general purpose financial statements
contains a balance sheet and income statement. Balance sheets record certain assets and
most liabilities and show the difference as owners’ equity; the income statement shows
how business activity drives changes in owners’ equity, by recording items of revenue
and associated items of expense to aggregate a period’s net income (or loss). Principles
concern determining those other assets and some liabilities not appearing on a balance
sheet and ascertaining the association between items of expense and revenue.
To unpack these broad examples, rules include specifying as assets accounts
receivable and as expenses charge-offs associated with receivables-generation. Examples
systems such as International Accounting Standards. See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral
Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, ACCOUNTING
HORIZONS (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Behavioral Evidence].
41

A common formulation distinguishes rules from principles and then treats the
aggregation of all these as standards. See Nelson, Behavioral Evidence, supra note 40.
42

Compare Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
LAW AND ECONOMICS 502-528 (2000).
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of possible rules might be that the allowance for doubtful accounts should be set at 5% of
receivables generated during normal times, 3% during economic booms, and 8% during
economic busts; a principle governing the allowance for doubtful accounts would direct
making a reasonable estimate of probable charge-offs in the light of past experience in
the business and its industry (what GAAP provides). An example of a principle might be
to associate expenses with revenue in a reasonable manner; a rule-approach to this topic
is that disbursements to acquire resources used up during an accounting period are
expenses of that period (what GAAP provides).
These examples are representative of GAAP.38A The excursion shows two things.
It shows how difficult it is to prove that GAAP is rules-based or principles-based. And it
shows, as with the examples of automobile-driving concepts, that GAAP is, in fact, a
mixture of the two. In an elaborate study required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC
confirmed this conclusion and thus resolved the (false) debate.
2. Resolution — The SEC found that existing GAAP is a mixture of rules and
principles.43 It declared the mixture substantially effective, and renamed it an objectivesbased system.44 The SEC study indicated that under such a system there should be
limited need ever to indulge a GAAP override.45 Complying with an objectives-based
GAAP yields “fairly presented” financial statements. This conclusion thus resolved what
otherwise loomed as a crisis: that GAAP would have to be scrapped if it could not
promote a fair presentation.
The SEC’s elaborate study of the rules-principles dichotomy shows the
dichotomy’s falsity. The SEC ultimately expresses the view that US GAAP is a mix of
principles and rules and designates neither as superior. Instead it embraces what it
believes to be a hybrid, which it calls an “objectives-based” system. It boils down to a
different name for the prevailing mix of rules and principles, all intended to promote
financial statements that “fairly present” financial condition and performance. This
38A

See also Nelson, Behavioral Evidence, supra note 40 (providing additional examples).

43

See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(d) OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, § III.G
(undated; released 2003) [hereinafter SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING STUDY].
44

“Substantially” because the SEC’s key prescription directs FASB to link future
accounting standards to its underlying conceptual framework as a way to promote this
objectives-based concept, which the SEC indicates likely will incrementally produce
results better characterized as principles than rules, though it does not regard the goal of
producing more principles than rules as a primary objective. See id.

45

Compare FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S.
STANDARD SETTING, supra note 4 (proposal to include a “true and fair view” override).
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resolution of the false dichotomy is correct, but the struggle that went into it is also a
false catharsis, for deeper issues unaddressed are at stake.46
At a more practical level, FASB’s statutory-like approach to accounting was
intended to enable accounting’s promulgators to respond to emerging issues and thwart
observed abuses. A limited capacity to anticipate managerial reactions to these
regulatory responses produces bias favoring rule-like pronouncements rather than
principles. This can create another problem: rules create cracks for exploitation. On the
other hand, accounting’s natural language origins cannot be squelched and, when
accompanied by brooding concepts such as fairly presents, forge congruity between
accounting and fair presentations. The reservoir of accounting concepts—code and
natural language alike—are abstractions requiring concrete circumstances for their
particularization.
Modern lawyers will recognize the false dichotomy in the rules-principles debate,
bearing echoes of contemporary discourse on the merits of legal positivism. Legal
positivism treats law as a system of rules. H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism contained a
theory of law and an account of adjudication.47 In it, law is a matter of rules, divided into
two types: primary rules stating duties or rights and secondary rules that regulate their
application (including the rule of recognition, a norms-based conception against which
the validity of all secondary and primary rules is gauged in terms of social acceptance).
Hart held that law’s use of language as expression invited judicial interpretation,
constrained through a conception of law as carrying an uncontroversial core component
along with a more contentious penumbra where discretion is exercised.
Modern legal theorists dating to Holmes doubted this conception, observing
judicial discretion even in the face of the most clearly defined legal concepts as rules.
Ronald Dworkin most successfully presented the more capacious conception of law as

46

The SEC may believe it ushered in a new regime. See supra note 44. In fact, some
regard contributions to the rules-principles debate as a major effect of Sarbanes Oxley.
Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 30, at 342-43:
Sarbanes-Oxley ushers in and accelerates a major and probably inevitable
transition, which will move us from a rules-based system of financial
disclosure to a principles-based system. In contrast to Europe, the United
States has long relied on a rules-based system in which generally accepted
accounting principles (or "GAAP") were precise, technical, and limited.
Typically, these narrow rules afforded safe harbors from liability for
issuers and gatekeepers. In contrast, European accounting principles were
broader, more generalized, and sometimes indefinite to the point of being
ineffable.
47

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW.
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including not only rules but also principles.48 These provide a spirit to law that guide
judges and others in applying rules. The principles are not necessarily instances of
natural law or morality, but are a feature of law to be interpreted. Law is thus a seamless
web of rules and principles, making positivism an impoverished account. Judicial
interpretation is not (only) a function of law as language with cores and penumbras but a
function of interpretive practice. Properly conducted, legal interpretation yields a correct
answer to any legal issue.
Whatever view a legal theorist holds on the critique of legal positivism, the
critique applies more forcibly to accounting as positive code. First, in accounting moral
conceptions are more attenuated. The spirit may be discernable, expressed in concepts of
fair presentation, but it is not a question of the natural moral order. Second, primary and
secondary concepts may be identifiable—a primary rule is to record revenue when earned
and a secondary rule is to achieve a fair presentation. But any equivalent to a rule of
recognition the accountant or auditor faces is hardly a function of social acceptance; at
best it is a matter of general acceptance within the profession and possibly among market
participants. Third, accounting is far more akin to a seamless system of rules and
principles. Despite discretion, moreover, even Herculean accountants might, in about the
same way as Herculean judges, be expected to reach correct results, at least in the sense
of achieving a fair presentation.
Law and accounting—in both code- and non-code-based form—involve
abstraction of the particular and particularization of the abstract.49 At maximal generality,
everything in the universe—or a given universe—is the same. In case law, every case is
of the form plaintiff versus defendant. This label is meaningless for its lack of
discrimination. At maximal specificity, everything is different. In cases, Brown v. Smith
tells something only about that particular case, meaningless due to its hyper-granularity.
Case analysis searches for the normatively-significant features of the case, such as buyer
versus seller for breach of warranty contained in a contract for the sale of goods. This is
combining particularity with generality to achieve normativity;50 this is the activity of the
accountant in determining how to apply GAAP to particular transactions so that resulting
financial statements are fair presentations of business reality.

48

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1973); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE.
49

See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 814-19 (1985) (showing mutual
dependency between law's conception of freedom of contract and the philosopher's social
contract. in the dual process of abstraction of the particular and particularization of the
abstract).
50

See Gregory M. Silverman, Imperatives, Normativity, and the Law, 31 CONN. L. REV.
601 (1999).
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Consider the relation between statutory (or regulatory) and common law.
Statutory (and regulatory) law can be drafted as neat, clean, and clear. The appearance is
deceiving, however, because rules are studded with loopholes and ambiguities.50A The
common law must be distilled, discerned, worked-over; it is understood as a capacious
system, and though prone to cracks, operating to seal the cracks are a variety of formal
institutional devices, including accepted modes of reasoning such as by analogy,
principles of stare decisis and precedent, and the recognition of appropriate institutions
and processes to make it operational.51 This complex process takes time. Accounting as
code and natural language bears similar characteristics; making GAAP a coherent system
likewise requires time. But accounting, as we will see, increasingly lacks the luxury of
time. And this is the fatal feature of the current accounting condition.

II. NUMERICAL HISTORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Traditional accounting is largely numerical history. An overarching accounting
concept holds that only transactions that have occurred are recorded. Accounting is
quintessentially history. Another holds that only transactions measurable in monetary
units are recorded. Accounting is quintessentially numerical. These basic propositions,
rooted in accounting’s ancient natural language and unchanged by its modern codifiers,
are assumed in all interesting questions of accounting theory. In related debates,
however, pressure increasingly appears to jettison these basics, sewing acorns for an oaksized movement away from accounting as numerical history and towards a far more
ambitious function as narrative prognosis.
A. The Basic Statements
Accounting’s traditional chief vehicles to express numerical history are the
balance sheet and income statement. A traditional debate in accounting theory considers
the relation between these two archival documents as tools to capture what has occurred.
A central question of accounting theory is whether the balance sheet and income
statement are both necessary components of a set of general purpose financial statements.
It is possible to record all transactions only in the balance sheet (revenues increase
owners’ equity and expenses reduce owners’ equity). In theory, at least, it is possible to
record all transactions in the income statement and ignore the balance sheet. The same
measurements are used in both reports (in accounting parlance, they articulate): the
difference between revenues and expenses constitutes earnings and this amount is
equivalent to the period’s change in owners’ equity.

50A

See Alexander & Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, supra note 20.

51

See Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1165 (1997).
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Consider two views of the conceptual underpinnings. The balance sheet view
sees revenues and expenses as resulting from changes in assets and liabilities (revenues
are asset increases and/or liability decreases while expenses are asset decreases and/or
liability increases). The income statement view sees earnings as the key, with assets and
liabilities as residual holding places for the results of operating activities driving revenues
and expenses.
FASB and the SEC take the balance sheet view.52 The balance sheet view
emphasizes measuring owners’ equity and changes in it (earnings simply drive this) while
the income statement view emphasizes measuring earnings (assets and liabilities are just
residuals; this places greater emphasis on accounting’s accrual concept and matching
principle, the idea that revenue should be recorded when earned and all items of expense
incurred to generate it be matched to the period in which it was earned).53
Heuristics are invoked to defend using both documents, whichever one is deemed
superior. The balance sheet is a statement of position (a snapshot, as of a date) and the
income statement is a statement of performance (a motion picture, for a period of time).
These images help explain why both documents are useful, but these images also show
the limits of each: they both look backward and use the same measurement concepts.
This invites an alternative possibility: finding a way to overcome these limits to improve
the qualities of both so that neither is superior to the other.
This possibility unfolds debate in a different direction, envisioning for accounting
a more ambitious role than numerical historian. This view admits that both statements
may be useful because they provide different perspectives, but contends that their unified
measurement means they essentially tell the same thing. If so, the documents are
essentially redundant due to an unnecessary urge for articulation (using the same
measurements for both).
To provide non-redundant information, assets and liabilities could be defined and
measured solely in reference to the balance sheet and revenues and expenses solely in
reference to the incomes statement. Different measures would be used for each
statement, shedding compulsion for articulation. This view is supported by the claim
that when you try to force articulation you get owners’ equity and earnings figures that
bear no indication of actual worth (value). Permitting non-articulation could enable
owners’ equity and earnings figures to indicate value.54 This argument reflects desire to
move accounting away from its historic-numeric model and towards a model of different
utility: to provide information about value, a prospective-looking conception.
52

See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING STUDY,
supra note 40.
53

The next section discusses accounting’s accrual concept and matching principle
further.
54

See RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY, supra note 12, at 126-133.
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Whether this ambition should be pursued is uncertain. To be ready for such
service, accounting’s fundamentals would need to be sturdier than appears possible. One
must be able to walk before one can run and accounting has enough difficulty walking.
A related fundamental question of accounting illustrates. When accounting choices entail
a recording system producing greater fidelity in the balance sheet or the income
statement, to which statement should the choice be more faithful?
Take accounting for inventory, on which GAAP offers choices.55 Leading
alternatives are to assume goods flow through a business on a first-in-first-out (FIFO)
basis or a last-in-first-out basis (LIFO). During inflationary periods, the FIFO assumption
is more faithful to economic reality in the balance sheet (current assets are recorded at
current levels but current cost of sales are recorded at outdated levels) while the LIFO
assumption is more faithful to economic reality in the income statement (costs are
recorded at current levels while assets are recorded at outdated levels).
In which statement should greater faithfulness be promoted? Most users of
financial information—as well as accountants, managers and auditors—regard the
income statement as more useful than the balance sheet.56 If so, when trade-offs arise in
relative fidelity between the respective statements and economic reality, the alternative
should be chosen that promotes greater fidelity in the income statement than in the
balance sheet.57 So a good measure of income should be privileged over a good measure
of owners’ equity (income statement over the balance sheet). In inflationary periods, this
means LIFO should be preferred to FIFO (and this appears reflected in the proportion of
companies choosing it).
Ambitious accounting theorists seek a way to enable using LIFO in the income
statement and FIFO in the balance sheet. As it exists, GAAP calls for articulation
between the two reports. That is, revenues minus expenses equal earnings and this
amount determines changes in owners’ equity. So the same method of determining the
cost of goods sold and inventory must be used in both statements. Allowing the two to
bear different measurements (that is, to allow for non-articulation) would improve fidelity
to economic reality. But, coming to the point, this does not imply that it would facilitate
superior valuation exercises.58 Superior accounting is superior numerical history, not
superior utility for forward-looking valuation exercises.
55

Notice how this is neither a standard nor a rule. Compare supra Part I.B.

56

This is the case for going concerns as opposed to business liquidations.

57

Again, the case for going concerns as opposed to business liquidations.

58

The non-articulation view was once supported by the American Accounting
Association, the professional association of academic accountants. Permitting nonarticulation between the income statement and balance sheet would presumably call for a
statement of reconciliation between the two.
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A related cardinal principle of accounting further illustrates the difficulty
accounting faces on its own numerical-historical terms. The concept is conservatism,
meaning a preference when judgments are close for understanding assets and revenues
and overstating liabilities and expense. As between LIFO and FIFO, LIFO may be more
conservative in both the income statement and the balance sheet for any given period.
But conservatism in the balance sheet, showing lower ending inventory, entails less
conservatism in the succeeding period’s income statement, showing lower expenses.59
So accounting faces inherent trade-offs on its own terms, with fundamental concepts such
as conservatism providing conflicting answers to basic questions.
This discourse on FIFO-LIFO shows it may be more useful to concentrate on
accounting’s integrity as numerical history before attempting to position it in more
ambitious roles. In the example, using FIFO or LIFO drives different reports of net
income and assets. The same is true for thousands of accounting questions, which cannot
be constrained by rules, principles, or fairly-presents requirements.
This prompts a simple (but revolutionary) proposal: to abandon the conceit of
computing a single number for earnings and a single number for owners’ equity and
instead report a range of reasonable figures for each.60 This would more fairly reflect the
fundamental challenges and limits of accounting, a system tied to numbers and history
yet still capable only of providing ranges with any reliability. Despite these realities,
demands on accounting increasingly push in opposite bolder directions, as the following
examples show.
B. Historical Cost or Fair Value?
Debate on the relative utility of the balance sheet versus the income statement,
and their articulation, shows accounting’s historic-numeric orientation. Associated limits
appear more fully by considering accounting for fixed assets (those with useful lives
covering multiple accounting periods). These are recorded at historical cost (less
59

This also affects the inventory turnover ratio, a key measure of business performance
that relates sales to the cost of sales: a company using LIFO rather than FIFO will show,
other things being equal, speedier inventory turnover.
60

The proposal’s appeal is invariant to whether a rules- or principles-framework
dominates, and indeed reinforces the sense that this is a false dichotomy. Put in those
terms, a rule is 2 + 2 = 4. There is no other correct answer to this question, what is 2 + 2.
A standard may be .33 + .33 + .33 = 1. The issues in accounting are more fundamental
than should we keep a rule that says 2 + 2 = 4 or adopt a standard allowing 2 + 2 to equal
other sums under certain circumstances. The issue is how to determine whether the
inputs are 2 and 2 versus 1 and 3. As the FIFO-LIFO example suggests, a fair answer
would be we are only certain that the inputs are either 2-and-1 (or in between) or 2-and-3
(or in between) so that the result fairly ranges from 3 to 5. This trade-off characterizes
nearly all accounting exercises.
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accumulated depreciation taken as a periodic expense, for most fixed-assets). Most
transactions other than those concerning fixed assets are recorded at fair value (inventory
is recorded at the lower of cost or market, with cost capturing pretty much current costs
given that inventory is a current asset). Should fixed assets be too?
In periods of changing prices, the historical-cost principle applied to fixed assets
diminishes the fidelity of reported amounts to current economic reality. Suppose a
company bought an acre of land 20 years ago for a cost of $100,000 and a contiguous
functionally identical acre today for $1 million.61 Its balance sheet would show a total for
these of $1.1 million (land is not subject to depreciation exercises—a rule). But the
figures suggest a total current value for them of $2 million. The historical cost principle
thus carries an embedded assumption that currency amounts are a stable unit of
measurement like gallons, tons, or miles. This assumption is false whenever average
price levels change.
For short periods of relatively stable prices the stable-currency assumption may
not matter much. But over short periods with rapidly changing price levels or long
periods with modest period-to-period changes, the assumption renders comparisons
difficult. In the aftermath of the hyper-inflationary period of the 1970s, FASB flirted
with concepts that would reflect inflationary effects on fixed asset carrying amounts. It
experimented with requiring large entities to report supplementary data concerning the
effects of inflation on current values and current replacement costs. The experiment
revealed that the costs of computing and supplying such data outweighed associated
benefits and the requirement was repealed.62
Despite this experiment’s failure, advocates of more ambitious goals for
accounting seek a fair-value approach.63 This fair-value movement favors reporting all
61

See ROBERT LIBBY, ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (3rd ed. 2001), at ___.

62

See American Bar Association Securities Regulation Subcommittee on Annual
Review, Significant 1986 Regulatory and Legislative Developments, 42 BUS. LAW. 827,
871-72 (1987) (noting 1986 repeal of FASB inflation accounting statement in effect
during the latter 1970s and adjustments to related SEC rules formerly requiring certain
large public companies to provide supplementary financial information on the impact of
inflation).
63

See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1996); see also
G. A. Swanson, Accountability and the Drift Towards ‘Fair Value Measurement’, AM.
ACCT. ASS’N REGIONAL MEETING PAPER, SSRN ID = 487043 (Apr. 6, 2004); see
generally FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
NO. 7, USING CASH FLOW INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING
MEASUREMENTS (Feb. 2000).
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assets on the balance sheet at fair value. The key reason for recording fixed assets at
historical cost is this provides an objective measure under the monetary transactions
principle; the key reason not to use fair value is conservatism. Fair value could be
reported using appraisals or comparable transactions, but the remaining subjective
element puts it in tension with the conservatism principle (when in doubt, understate
assets). Also the benefit may be modest, since users of balance sheets read them later
than the balance sheet date and by then fair value may have changed.64
But reporting some assets at historical cost and others at fair value produces a
total asset figure consisting partly of oranges and partly of apples.65 An alternative
proposal exhibiting more modesty meets this objection. It asks whether accounting needs
a statement reporting fixed assets at all.66
Suppose a different statement of
position/condition than the balance sheet, such as a “statement of solvency.” It would
show all resources and claims susceptible to objective measure and denominate the
difference between the two as a measure of solvency (the capacity to meet long term
obligations when they come due).
Financial statement analysts distinguish liquidity, capacity to meet short-term
obligations, from solvency, capacity to meet long-term obligations. Beyond that,
however, solvency is rarely discussed in accounting literature, though frequently
analyzed in law.67 A solvency statement would be like a balance sheet in capturing a
moment in time. In contrast, it would only report those assets that can be measured at
fair value. This would exclude most fixed assets (as well as most intangible assets).
They can be reported in the notes.68
64

Limits of using the historical cost principle for fixed assets is another argument for
income statement supremacy over the balance sheet. On the other hand, given articulation
between the two, limits on the balance sheet imply limits on the income statement.
Moreover, examining the concept of accumulated depreciation leads to the same deadend. It can be a useful proxy for required reinvestment. Reporting fixed assets at fair
value and tying depreciation expense to that amount would enhance the reliability of
accumulated depreciation as a proxy. True, depreciation would remain principally a costallocation exercise implementing the matching principle. But for long-held assets during
inflationary periods, its utility as a proxy for required reinvestment would improve. The
trade-off is between reliability and usefulness: fair values may be more useful but absent
actual markets where those values are registered they may be less reliable.
65

See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOKLYN L. REV. 763, 826-834 (1995) [hereinafter, Kitch, Theory and Practice].
There is nothing wrong with adding apples and oranges but the result is a basket of fruit,
difficult to compare with other fruit baskets.
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See ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
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See id.

68

See infra Part II.A.1.
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The solvency-statement proposal and fair-value movement straddle existing
balance sheet norms. In effect, the balance sheet compromises a tension between
measuring the immeasurable (objective fair-value estimates for fixed assets) and unifying
what cannot be unified (apples and oranges). The solvency concept recognizes
measurement limits by limiting reported asset amounts to those susceptible to objective
measurement. The fair value movement reflects frustration with accounting’s traditional
orientation towards history, seeking a more current orientation. This view reflects a more
general climate of frustration with accounting’s historic-numerical disposition,
epitomized ultimately by making cash a rival to accrual accounting.
C. Accrual or Cash?
Accounting as natural language and as code uses the accrual system. This
allocates economic events to discrete accounting periods based upon a link to underlying
business activity. It contrasts with the cash-basis of accounting, which records events
when cash is exchanged. The accrual system’s theoretical basis includes the stewardship
function of accounting information, a fundamentally historical perspective. Financial
reports should reflect how well managers have operated a business. The accrual system’s
key device, the matching principle, pursues this aspiration by insisting that expenses
burden the income statement in the period they contribute to revenue generation (or
earlier if this cannot be determined, under the conservatism principle).
In the past two decades, a separate statement of cash flows has joined the balance
sheet and income statement as an essential component of a set of general purpose
financial statements.69 The accrual system obscures cash flows; the cash flow statement
makes them transparent. Financial statement analysts and finance theorists increasingly
focus on cash flows, casting doubt upon the utility of the accrual basis of accounting.
Consider the following assertion: cash flow is a fact, while earnings are an opinion. This
assertion is from the title of an important article by a leading financial economist.70 The
provocative titleimplies numerous points, twoof which are notable here.
69

FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
(SFAS) 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS ¶ 27 (Nov. 1987); Cunningham, An Essay on
the True and Fair View, supra note 25 (providing historical perspective).
70

Pablo Fernández, Cash Flow is a Fact; Net Income is Just an Opinion (Sept. 2002),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=330540. A famous contemporary debate in accounting
theory evaluates whether valuation according to earnings or cash flows is superior.
Compare Stephen Penman, On Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models
for Use in Equity Valuation, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RESEARCH (2001) (the case that
accounting matters and that accrual-earnings based valuation models are superior to cash
flow models) with Russell J. Lundholm & Terry O’Keefe, On Comparing Cash Flow and
Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity Valuation: A Response to Penman 2001, 18
CONTEMP. ACCT. RESEARCH (2001) (when applied correctly, valuation models using
earnings and cash flow should yield identical estimates).
25

First, the cash flow statement’s power opens up possibilities for accounting never
plausible with the balance sheet and income statement alone. Cash flows are a more
reliable tool than traditional accounting data drawn from balance sheets and income
statements in predicting bankruptcy filings under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code
and insolvency generally.71 Evidence suggests that the cash flow statement is superior
compared to the balance sheet for measuring accruals as a way to test for the presence of
earnings management in the income statement.72 Past cash flows are usually a better
indicator of future cash flows than are earnings (though predictions can be improved by
using the two together).
Second, the leading use of the cash flow statement is a basis for making valuation
determinations. And the leading basis for making valuation decisions is cash flow.73 In
fact, discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation became, in the latter half of the 20th century,
the dominant valuation method, rendering to history’s dustbins traditional valuation using
assets or earnings. Despite resistance through the early 1980s,74 DCF is now routinely
used to gauge business value. Institutions ranging from U.S. courts to the World Bank
endorse DCF valuation methods.75
Two features of valuation emphasizing cash flow stand out. First, what constitutes
cash flow must be specified. On a cash flow statement the amounts are usually
specified—they can be facts—but when analyzing them a wide variety of possibilities
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See DIVESH SHANKAR SHARMA & ERROL R. ISELIN, THE DECISION USEFULNESS OF
REPORTED CASH FLOW AND ACCRUAL INFORMATION IN A BEHAVIORAL FIELD
EXPERIMENT, available at http://www.ssrn.com.
See Gopal V. Krishnan & James A. Largay, The Predictive Ability of Direct Method
Cash Flow Information, 27 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 215 (2000).
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See e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE (2000); RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed. 1991); WILLIAM W.
BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002); compare BRUCE
C.N. GREENWALD, ET AL., VALUE INVESTING (2001) (the case against making discounted
cash flow analysis the dominant valuation method in favor of emphasizing asset-based
valuation or earnings-based valuation).
74

Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (abandoning previous
business valuation framework reliant upon a weighted average of value estimated using
assets, earnings and market price, in favor of framework permitting all generally
recognized valuation methods, the ascendant one of which was DCF).
See M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (1999); WORLD BANK,
REPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, Sept. 21, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1363,1379 (1992).
75
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appear. They all start with GAAP earnings but then exclude or include a host of
discretionary items.76 Resulting expressions (like EBIT, EBIDTA and so on) are not
accounting concepts. They do not appear in accounting’s natural-language history nor in
its FASB-codifications.77 Rather, these concepts are recent inventions of investment
bankers and other financiers.78 Using them thus requires narrative evaluation and
explanation. Second, DCF analysis projects cash flows into the distant future, at least five
years and usually for a horizon period beyond that of 10 to 15 years.79 Popularity of DCF
thus underlines a shift in accounting information from accounting as numerical history to
accounting as narrative prognosis.

III. NARRATIVE PROGNOSIS AND ITS LIMITS
If you sold 5 widgets last year, it is clearly a lie to report selling 6. If you say you
expect to sell 6 widgets next year, it is not clearly a lie to say you hope to sell 7. This is a
key difference between accounting as numerical history and accounting as narrative
prognosis. The former is about facts; the latter is about hopes and expectations.
Two salient features of the late 1990s bubble were proliferation of analyst
earnings reports specifying expectations and corporate pro forma reporting expressing
hopes. Both phenomena show indulgence of accounting as narrative prognosis, not
numerical history. Analysts expect certain results, an inherently prospective concept.80
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Common short-hands include earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD), and earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). In each case, adjustments are made by
subtractin g from resulting cash-flow figures estimates of future required reinvestments in
the business for capital expenditures.
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In fact, FASB-ordained GAAP prohibits providing cash flow per share figures in a set
of general purpose financial statements. See FIN. ACC. STANDARDS BD., RELEASE ___.
78

See H. Erik Lee & Heidi Lee, Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value, 58 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. ___ (March/April 2002).
79

See CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR
LAWYERS, supra note 17, ch. 12 (discussion of valuation techniques, including DCF).
80

The rise of this analyst function is a significant inimical phenomenon impairing
accounting’s integrity. The regulatory response, Regulation FD, went to a different
perception of the problem: equal access to management. See D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street
v. Main Street: The SEC’s New Regulation FD and Its Impact on Market Participants, 77
IND. L. J. 551 (2002). The real issue is the information to which access is given, which is
not hard historical numbers but soft future-oriented narration. It was called “guidance.”
See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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Managers peddling pro forma data understood they were not talking about numerical
history but offering something else—hope.81
A common feature of accounting fraud is rosy views of the future. A manager
believes certain targets can be reached—expecting 6 and hoping for 7. The future
reporting of numerical history will be superior—better than 5. This can create sufficient
optimism to doctor current pictures of numerical history (call it 6 this year), with a view
towards the rosier future absorbing the difference between actual history and the
imagined future (if we in fact sell 5 this year but 7 the year after, call it 6 apiece).82
Moreover, since no actual sales or receivables have been generated, and no inventory
sold, there are no hard numbers to report, only estimates; and estimates must be
explained, requiring narrative (we expect to sell 6 because of a new customer and hope to
sell 7 because of a new manager).
As greater emphasis is placed on the future, the temptation to pursue this course
increases. And the closing decade of the 20th century produced wide-scale social
preoccupation with the future.83 This preoccupation is evident in financial reporting and
disclosure, in which accounting is the heart. Along with the rise of discounted-cash-flow
valuation techniques, manifestations of analyst expectations and pro forma hopes were
81

The practice of pro forma financial reporting became widespread in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. This involved presenting financial data in forms deliberately varying from
GAAP. While managers defended these using various obfuscating arguments, including
that GAAP just didn’t work well for their special business, underlying it was an impulse
to show how the future would likely look. It was an attempt to be liberated from GAAP,
but more because of its inherent qualities as numerical history. Managers—and
investors—wanted information bearing more futuristic utility. The misleading
proliferation of pro forma accounting in the late 1990s spawned a section of SarbanesOxley cracking down on its proliferation. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 401(b), Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 7266. But as with other reforms, this does
not really get at the underlying issue concerning the impulse and demand for narrative
prognosis rather than numerical history.
82

Cf. In the Matter of BT Securities Corporation, 58 S.E.C. DOCKET 1145, 1994 SEC
LEXIS 4041 (Dec., 22 1994), reprinted in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, ET AL., CORPORATE
FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE: CASES (2d ed. 1996), at 286. In this matter, tape recordings
of a derivatives trader captured him describing how undisclosed losses on a client
account would be made up when the market moved favorably, as follows:
. . . [T]he real number was 14. So now if the real number is 16, we’ll tell
him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away at that differential
between what it really is and what we’re telling him.
83

See Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(contemporary risk management concepts showing increasing social preoccupation with
the future).
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part of broader changes forced on accounting’s role, both antedating these manifestations
and—ironically—sustained in reforms made in their wake.
A. Contemporary Evolution (Pre-Scandal)
Accounting reports have long been accompanied by narrative materials but the
narrative component expanded dramatically during the latter 20th century.84 In its final
decades, moreover, the narrative platform became a basis for launching an expanding
range of forward-looking discussion, making forecasts that revolutionized the nature of
financial reporting. These trends reflect and fuel market demand for glimpses into the
future.
1. Narration — Information provided in narrative is substantial compared to that
provided numerically85 Financial statements are accompanied by elaborate narrative
footnote disclosure explaining the accounting concepts applied and the significance of
numerical data. Supplementary data often appears, likewise accompanied by substantial
narrative explanation. Since the 1980s, federal securities laws require narrative
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) in addition to numerical presentation of
accounting information. Using narrative information reflects both the limits of
accounting’s traditional numerical bias and demand for such qualitative accounting.
Numerous judgments enter into producing financial statements. These judgments
are disguised by the numerical bottom lines, impressing the numbers with false scientific
inevitability. Under accounting requiring specific numerical designations (as
distinguished from the proposal made in Part II to provide a range of numbers),86 their
meaning must be expressed in narrative.
Consider how the balance sheet measures various assets according to differing
metrics: fixed assets at historical cost less accumulated depreciation and other assets at
fair value—with these subject to various conventions, such as inventory using FIFO or
LIFO and accounts receivable net of an estimated allowance for doubtful accounts.

84

Traditional accounting as numerical history contains hints of prognosis. For example,
estimating bad debt expense associated with generating accounts receivable is
prognostication as a forecast of probable recoveries. These estimates, however, are
simultaneously constrained by the conservatism principle. See supra text accompanying
note ___.
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This observation is unexceptional: balance sheets, income statements and cash flow
statements are each either one or two pages long, while footnotes and management’s
discussion and analysis in typical annual reports extend for dozens of pages each.
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See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
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These differences—apples and oranges—must be explained to make the data
comprehensible for a company and comparable with its peers.87
A key reason for narrative disclosure concerns the relation of the fair presentation
requirement to GAAP’s capacity, discussed in Part I. Accounting numeracy may be
misleading, overall, unless choices are explained. This is the essence of SEC disclosure
advice requiring an overall presentation that fairly presents performance and condition in
all material respects.88 Narrative disclosure often is essential to achieving this result.
This is the case without regard to whether GAAP is living language or code, or whether
founded upon rules or principles.
Narrative disclosure is also a way to include information not otherwise reported
on the financial statements. Examples are endless: loss contingencies such as pending
litigation and regulatory action, aging of accounts receivables, inventory measurements
and obsolescence histories, depreciation schedules and so on.89 This is also the approach
FASB took to its inflation-accounting experiment of the 1980s, flirting with requiring
supplementary disclosure concerning the effects of inflation on fixed asset carrying
amounts using narrative to explain methodology.90
The limits of numerical accounting appear in an AICPA proposal for a
comprehensive model of accounting information disclosure.91 It would go far beyond the
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flows, to embrace the kinds of
87

Suppose Company A and Company B both report total assets of $1 million. They
appear similar. But suppose Company A’s reported assets consist of $900,000 of fixed
assets (at historical cost less depreciation) plus $100,000 in marketable securities (at fair
value) while Company B’s consist of the opposite mix. The total asset figures are
meaningless. You need to know the mix. True, liabilities are typically carried at fair
value (the present value of the obligation). But given the obscure asset side, the net
worth or owners’ equity figure is mythical. Return on equity is not comparable.
Individual items are useful, while aggregates are not necessarily. See ANTHONY,
RETHINKING THE RULES, supra note 12.
88

See supra text accompanying notes ___ to ___.
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For a broader example, see Jeffrey Uneman, Enhancing Organizational Global
Hegemony with Narrative Accounting Disclosures: An Early Example, 27 ACCOUNTING
FORUM 425 (2003) (use of politically-oriented narrative accounting disclosure to enhance
corporate power versus nation states).
90

See supra text accompanying notes ___ to ___.
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The AICPA is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. See EDMOND L.
JENKINS ET AL., THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF INVESTORS AND CREDITORS (1995) (report
of an AICPA committee called the Jenkins Committee, after chairman Edmond L.
Jenkins, then FASB Chairman) [hereinafter, JENKINS COMMITTEE REPORT].
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narrative disclosure found in the federal securities laws. Accounting as numerical
expression, confined to the basic financial statements, is inadequate. It must be explained
using words.
An advantage to requiring narrative disclosure is comparative ease of generating
appropriate directives, whether using principles or rules. A directive to “describe and
explain” can be drafted and adopted quickly, compared to a set of principles or rules
defining how a type of transaction is to be classified, measured and reported. A good
recent example concerns off-balance sheet financing. SEC rules adopted promptly in the
wake of early 2000’s scandal-revelations require descriptions of these when material.92 It
would take far more time and elaborate process to specify the circumstances under which
certain complex transactions need to be accounted for on the balance sheet and their
effects on income.93
A similar narrative approach is used to handle a wide variety of controversial
accounting matters. Until mid-2004, FASB generally approached stock options by
requiring narrative disclosure of their effects on earnings per share, not reported on the
income statement.94 Until the early 1990s, a similar approach was taken towards retiree
benefit obligations.95 Managers often prefer the narrative approach to such controversial
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SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RELEASE NOS. 33-8350; 34-48960; FR-72,
INTERPRETATION: COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND
ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS (December 22, 2003).
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Resort to narrative disclosure likewise rounds out the rough edges of innovative reform
proposals, including for example the statement of solvency concept discussed above,
which would leave off the balance sheet most fixed assets as lacking objectivemeasurability, and reporting these instead in the notes. See supra text accompanying
note ___.
94

See CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, supra note 16, ch. 6; compare FIN.
ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (SFAS) 148
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION—TRANSITION AND DISCLOSURE (an
amendment of Statement No. 123) (requiring, after decades of intense resistance from
corporate America, recording stock option as an expense on the income statement); but
see HOUSE BILL, THE STOCK OPTION ACCOUNTING REFORM ACT (contemplating blocking
adoption of this standard).
95

See Kenneth E. Dakdduk & Jules M. Cassel, A Guide to Implementation of Statement
106 on Employers’ Accounting for Post-retirement Benefits other than Pensions (FASB,
Aug. 1993; rev. ed. Dec. 98; rev. ed. Sept. 2001); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (SFAS) 106, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR
POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS.
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matters, showing that demand for narrative can arise not only from consumers of
financial information, but from those who prepare it.96
Demand from external users plays a significant role in generating narrative
financial reporting. Traditional accounting’s grammar, using monetary-units, is not
susceptible to reporting non-financial matters. Consider the role of employees in firms.
They are often a major “asset” in a sense (contributing to revenue-generating power);
they do not appear on the balance sheet because the company does not “own” them.
Narrative provides information on matters concerning employee training,
recruitment/retention, investment and know-how.
In the same vein, consider for whom accounting information is prepared.
Traditional financial statements are for external users, but this broad category tends to
associate with creditors, shareholders and other commercial parties such as long-term
customers or suppliers. Many other constituents claim interests and have informational
needs not always met by traditional financial statements. Groups include employees,
governmental agencies and public policy advocates. GAAP doesn’t always give these
consumers information they need and supplemental narrative is a way to compel (or
volunteer) its production.97
From yet broader policy perspectives, accounting information—in numerical and
narrative form—coupled with mandatory disclosure, can be understood as seeking to
promote equity in capital markets.98 In this sense equity means the negation of
96

Compare Anthony J., Enron End-Runs, supra note 4, at 102 (criticizing arguments
favoring providing financial information in footnotes rather than in statements themselves
as follows:
one must . . . question why various industries continue to fight with such
vehemence against proposals to require the expensing of stock-based
compensation if the same degree of transparency is being provided by
virtue of footnote disclosure. The obvious answer is that the footnotes
simply do not carry as much weight as the actual numbers in a balance
sheet or income statement—the numbers on which various computations
and ratios are often primarily based . . . .
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A dramatic example is social responsibility audits. There is no place for these in
GAAP but they are increasingly popular or demanded. See David Hess, Social Reporting:
A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 41
(1999); Lewis D. Solomon, Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held
Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993); see also
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Corporate Social
Transparency].
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See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, THE
ACCOUNTING REVIEW (January 1988), at 1-22.
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asymmetric information between insiders (management) and outsiders (investors and
others) and erasure of the differences between informed and uninformed constituents.
When these conditions exist, the market is fully-informed, and fairness optimized.
2. Forward-Looking Emphasis — Narrative disclosure is essential to provide the
range of information detailed in the preceding section. Unlike numerical disclosure,
however, narrative furnishes a convenient platform to launch into forward-looking
discussion and analysis. Until the late 1970s, the SEC and federal securities law
prohibited disclosure of forward-looking information.99 In that period, market appetite
for forward-looking information intensified.100
Participants pressured the SEC to change its stance. After substantial resistance,
the SEC finally relented, allowing forward-looking disclosure. Thereafter the SEC went
further, encouraging and sometimes requiring forward-looking information.101 The SEC
characterizes related disclosure as addressing “trends and uncertainties” in a business.102
This opens up accounting’s historical bias towards narrative prognosis.
Revisiting this debate’s history and terms is useful. The movement for forwardlooking disclosure occurred at the same time as the movement for greater codification of
GAAP discussed in Part I. In the early 1970s, SEC Chief Accountant John Burton,
among others, challenged the newly-established FASB to improve the quality of
accounting promulgations while simultaneously pushing for forward-looking
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See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5362; EXCHANGE ACT
RELEASE NO. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH ) ¶ 79,211 at
82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) ("It has been the Commission's longstanding policy generally not
to permit projections to be included in . . . reports filed with the Commission");
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GUIDES FOR DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS FOR
FUTURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5992 (1978)
(authorizing forward-looking disclosure).
100

E.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. (Summer 1976) at 32, 35-37.
101

See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b) (“The Commission encourages the use . . . of management's projections of
future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an
appropriate format."); id., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (mandating disclosure of "any
known trends or uncertainties that [management] reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing operations").
102

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. §
229.303; see generally Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A
Disclosure, 25 SEC. REG. L. J. 239 (1997).
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Although these activists achieved limited success in improving
disclosure.103
accounting’s qualities as numerical history, they unleashed a revolution in financial
reporting by opening it up to narrative prognosis.104
Opponents of forward-looking disclosure made three key arguments favoring the
SEC’s traditional stance prohibiting prognostication.105 First, forward-looking statements
are inherently unreliable and misleading per se.106 No one is clairvoyant, and therefore
management can be no more clairvoyant than investors or other users of financial reports.
Second, investors likely would assign undue credence to formal managerial disclosure of
forward-looking information, despite this inherent unreliability. Third, forward-looking
information is susceptible to managerial manipulation to a far greater degree than is hard
historical fact. All three objections have proven valid, underscored by the accounting
frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Supporters of forward-looking disclosure emphasized that all investment
valuation and related decisions are about the future, a point opponents did not and do not
dispute. Disagreement concerned whether managers or investors are better positioned to
conduct prognostication. While supporters did not believe either group was clairvoyant,
they did opine that managers were somehow better equipped than investors to provide
reasonable forecasts.107 They also redefined the target audience for financial disclosure
from the average ordinary investor to the sophisticated investor, an effort to negate the
claim that investors would give undue credence to managerial forecasts.108 Finally,
manipulation risk could be neutralized by imposing on managers an obligation of good
faith when providing forward-looking disclosure.109
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John Burton, Elephants, Flexibility and the Financial Accounting Standards Board , 29
BUS. LAW. 152 (1974) [hereinafter Burton, Elephants and Flexibility]; see also Homer
Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1151 (1970) [hereinafter Kripke, Myths and Realities].
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See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 554-555.
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See Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulations, 16
BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961) (despite reality that investment value is a function of future
financial performance, managers are not clairvoyant and management attempts at
forecasting are “almost invariably . . . misleading because they suggest to the investor a
competence and authority which in fact does not exist”).
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SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 611.
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See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103.
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See Burton, Elephants and Flexibility, supra note 103.
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See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103, at 1198-99.
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The debate’s resolution led to a system requiring more and more forward-looking
disclosure, with SEC releases in 1979, 1982 and 1989 increasing this orientation.110
Early proponents disagreed as to whether this regime should be voluntary or mandatory;
the result was initially an experimental regime based on voluntary disclosure that
gradually moved to one mandating specific kinds of forward-looking disclosure.111 Also
debated was whether forward-looking information should be targeted at the sophisticated
investor or all investors. Supporters argued that managers provided forecasts to
sophisticated investors outside formal SEC filings and that all should be entitled to this
information.112 While this reality was unchanged through the late 1990s, the SEC then
adopted Regulation FD to require that any such guidance provided to one investor be
provided simultaneously to the entire public.113
Regulatory efforts ensuing from this debate thus addressed numerous contentious
questions. The resulting regime is mostly mandatory; good faith and reasonable bases are
required; and all investors—sophisticated and novice alike—are entitled to the same
predictions. Never resolved in this debate on the merits, however, is the argument of
opponents that forward-looking information is inherently unreliable. It remains true,
after all, that no one is clairvoyant. The late 1990s and early 2000s also show that even
so-called sophisticated investors are not immune from being fooled by managerial
manipulations.
Accordingly, the SEC’s early cautious regulatory response to market demand for
futuristic information showed prudence. The reality that forward-looking information is
inherently unreliable manifested itself immediately. Managers would forecast various
business developments for market participants eager to clarify their own cloudy crystal
balls. When these judgments turned out differently, plaintiffs’ lawyers sued. This
litigation manifested symptoms of the underlying reality that forward-looking
110

See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 611 (SEC’s
1982 adoption of Item 303 of Regulation S-K concerning MD&A and forward-looking
information “is the key part of the evolution of the Commission’s approach to accounting
from an emphasis on ‘hard fact’ to its present emphasis on ‘soft’ or predictive
information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item”).
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See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 559-561.
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Compare Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103 (objecting to extant practice that
SEC position perpetuated of “differential disclosure,” meaning professionals receiving
projections in presentations, conference calls and press releases the public at large did not
receive) with Burton, Elephants and Flexibility, supra note 103 (urging reorientation of
SEC target audience from “the investor without clout, if you will” and “sophisticated
investors and professional analysts through whom information would be filtered down to
less sophisticated investors and their brokers”).
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information is inherently unreliable. Rather than ever confronting this reality squarely,
the regulatory regime focused on these symptoms by designing devices to address
associated litigation abuses.114
The leading device to address litigation abuses associated with forward-looking
information is a body of safe harbor provisions that insulate issuers from liability in
private actions when forward-looking statements are accompanied by cautionary
language underscoring their basic unreliability. The SEC, Congress and courts all
participated in developing related doctrines.115 The judiciary used the so-called
bespeaks-caution doctrine,116 providing a case-by- case evaluation of whether forwardlooking information was accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert a
reasonable investor to the information’s tentative quality.117

114

See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 559-560
(quoting SEC official and leading securities lawyer of the period, A. A. Sommer, as
saying that litigation aspects were the “biggest headache” associated with the new
forward-looking disclosure regime).
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See Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6; Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Section 27A of the 1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. §
78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 Act). For a concise summary of the intricate
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act addressing the relationship
between its safe-harbor provisions and the kinds of forward-looking information that are
required, encouraged, and permitted, see Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Karen Kennard, Greater
Expectations: Risk Disclosure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 331, 335-354 (1996).
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See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993);
Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635
(6th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Ivax Corp ., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999) (also interpreting
Congressional and SEC safe harbor provisions); see generally Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
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Courts provided varying formulations of the doctrine, though generally they applied to
both misstatements and omissions, solely to prospective information, with particularized
cautionary language related directly to the relevant disclosure. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2003), at
1017-20 (summarizing cases and positions by circuit). In general, however, it is a
pragmatic application of basic principles of securities law, chiefly designed to balance
generating useful but contingent information against dangers that issuers could hide
behind bad news by cloaking it in cautionary garb. See Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d
164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994).
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While some evidence indicates that the forward-looking disclosure system
enhanced the overall quality of information and its interpretation,118 drawbacks appear.119
When managers forecast future earnings, and equip analysts to do so and these widely
disseminate expectations across the market-place, enormous pressure to meet those
expectations arises. (When you sold 5 widgets, you created a historical record; when you
say you expect to sell 6 and hope to sell 7, you have created expectations and hopes.)
Managers who fail to meet expectations and hopes are punished severely. This in turn
increases the pressure to enhance reports of numerical history to conform to the narrative
prognosis previously painted.120 The result is often snowball accounting: continuing
pressure to repaint the numerical history to conform to increasingly out-of-reach narrative
prognosis.
These effects are not met by regulatory efforts to police the litigation fallout from
prognostication. More difficult than second-guessing by litigation is the first-order stage
on which this information is demanded and supplied. Demand for forward-looking
information is demand for what is inherently unreliable. Supplying the information sets
markers that are bound to result in disappointment. Specifying the targets creates
pressure to meet them, and when fundamental business strategies cannot do so,
accounting massage becomes more tempting.121
118

COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 117, at 6 (citing Artyom
Durnev et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New
Evidence, PRESENTATION AT THE AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION
ANNUAL MEETING (May 12, 2001) (examining impact of mandatory forward-looking
disclosure in MD&A on share prices).
119

See Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477 (1994)
(reviewing history of forward-looking disclosure regime and examining litigation arising
under it). For a general assessment and prescriptions to reform the forward-looking
disclosure regime not using safe-harbors but through formal SEC release articulating its
parameters and furnishing detailed guidance, see Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished
Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995); see also Suzanne J.
Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the
Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 245 (1993) (providing more optimistic
assessment).
120

In theory, ex ante awareness of future punishment for disappointed expectations
should constrain managerial optimism; in practice, this constraint is weak. See Joseph
Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 14
(2002).
121

Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause other Social Harms), 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 101, 126 (1997):
Forward-looking disclosure . . . must often be made with less-thancomplete confidence of their accuracy, with the nagging sense that with
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Not only has inadequate attention been paid to this feature of the contemporary
financial reporting environment,122 the safe-harbor mechanisms used to address the
identified litigation problem appear equally inadequate to their task. Needed is a tool to
address both challenges, of constraining undue second-guessing litigation and
constraining making forecasts that likely engender pressure to report accounting figures
in light of those estimates rather than subsequent business reality.
One possibility exists in SEC rules. The rules governing forward-looking safe
harbors invite auditors to provide assurance with respect to forward-looking information
contained in the MD&A (as well as other information in the MD&A).123 Issuers have not

more time, doubts about data quality might naturally diminish. From time
to time, senior executives will discover, much too late, that the truth is
indeed quite different from what they have been led to believe. To be sure,
senior executives cannot explicitly acknowledge this. Part of the essential
dramaturgical role of senior managers is to communicate confidence and
control over their environment, and . . . many management theorists
believe that effective corporate disclosure must reflect a comparable level
of confidence in control, if not performance, by the senior management
group. Thus, even putting aside the possibility that those top managers
have their own selfish reasons to distort, there is a substantial risk of a
mismatch between what they say and what, once a retrospective look at
what all those in the organization actually knew or sensed is undertaken,
was "known" by others in the firm.
Mismatch risk poses two challenges: second-guessing litigation, which the securities law
framework has addressed, and pressure to finesse a match, to which inadequate attention
appears to be paid. Compare Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort,
Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. L. REV. 773 (2004) (examining judicial responses to
disappointed expectations arising from prognosis).
122

Debate concerning the merits of a forward-looking disclosure system was intense in
the 1970s (see supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text), but thereafter cooled and the
system’s role in the financial frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s was neglected.
123

For example, statutory safe harbors define forward looking statements to mean:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income
(including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for
future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or
services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any
such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial
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engaged auditors to perform this service, though auditors are eager and willing to provide
it. In fact, the AICPA’s proposal to render narrative information a formal part of
accounting reports indicated that in addition to financial statements, the AICPA would
call for the equivalent of the MD&A, including forward-looking information, as a formal
part of financial accounting.124 Such reliance upon auditors is not likely to be feasible at
present given diminished public trust in the auditing profession due to the numerous audit
failures of the late 1990s and early 2000s. But it could be attractive when that profession
rebuilds public trust, and could help curtail rosy prognostication by naturally-optimistic
managers.
Requiring auditors to provide such assurance would not change the inherently
unreliability of earnings forecasts, however. A more general alternative to the broad
regime of forward-looking disclosure appears. Rather than require, permit, or encourage
managers to provide forecasts of earnings, the regime could simply require managers to
disclose material risks of future adversity.125 The purpose of this regime would be to
provide a basis upon which to permit investors to gauge the degree to which a company’s
numerical history is useful as a guide to probable future performance. Inherently
unreliable estimates of future performance would not be required, permitted or
encouraged.
B. What’s Next?126 (Post-Scandal)

condition by the management or in the results of operations included
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer,
to the extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by
the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other
items as may be specified by rule or regulation of the commission.
Securities Exchange Act, § 21E(a).
disclosure.
124

Item E captures auditor attestations of related

JENKINS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 91.

125

See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1154-56 (2003)
(prescribing a complete overall of MD&A to provide “what investors really want and
need [which] is a warning of material future risks . . . [and] discussion of their
probability and magnitude from management's perspective . . .”).
126

Pun intended.
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If recent cultural pressure on accounting moves it from numerical history to
narrative prognosis, both features of the latter trend are reinforced by recent reforms.
This shows not only misdiagnose of the disease and questionable prescription, it firmly
manifests the depth and ubiquity of modern culture’s preoccupation with the future.
1. Continuous Disclosure System — The apotheosis of this trend is the pressure
for a continuous disclosure system. This is a concept designed to require real-time
display of various financial developments.127 Long sought by market participants and
recently encouraged by the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds force to this movement by
directing the SEC to adopt rules to hasten the phenomenon. Under the Act, companies
must disclose publicly on a "rapid and current basis" all material changes in their
financial condition or operations, including trends, qualitative information and graphic
presentations.128
The Act uses the word disclose, disguising a more profound shift in market
appetite and regulatory philosophy—likewise disguising latent dangers. The innovation
of the original federal securities laws was a move to disclosure. Mandatory disclosure,
Brandeis famously quipped, is the best disinfectant.129 Current pressures for real-time
display go beyond disclosure. They move towards transparency.
Contemporary calls for heightened transparency across society often appear as
unbounded virtues.130 But good reasons appear to doubt this proposition.131 Bismarck

127

See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); Dale Arthur Oseterle, The Inexorable March
Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: Are We
There Yet?, 20 CARDOZO L REV. 135 (1998); see also Erik D. Prohs, Note, Periodic
Reporting: A Relic of the Past?, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 481 (2002).
128

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. §
78o-6.
129

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914),
at 92 ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.").
130

See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996):
Transparency is an eleventh commandment of American life
generally, not just of financial markets. We insist on open hearings all
through government; we open up to public scrutiny under the Freedom of
Information Act the records that elsewhere would be kept confidential; we
relentlessly pursue the tax returns and business dealings of almost anyone
seeking high public office. We do all this as part of the public's
unquestioned (if sometimes exaggerated) "right to know." It comes as no
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reportedly cautioned: “If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one
being made.”132 The same is true for those who like financial reports. Consider how
managers are to develop this continuous information-display.
Companies generate internal daily financial data, such as sales, accounts
receivable balances and charge-offs, and inventory levels and obsolescence. These show
trends. They can amount, on a temporary basis, to material changes in financial
condition and operation. Mandatory display of these is functionally equivalent to
mandatory transparency of business operations on a daily basis. It opens for view daily
financial recording, not periodic financial reporting.
Yet daily changes are not indicative of quarterly or annual aggregates. This
information is most useful to managers during an accounting/operating period. It equips
them to make course corrections, taking such steps as strengthening sales efforts in
lagging segments or improving collection practices when receivables charge-offs rise in
certain customer bases. The information is useful to redirect trends and to manage the
materiality and direction of financial condition and operation.
Whether corrections succeed take more than a few days of dashboard data to sort
out. Premature disclosure of adverse trends may sustain them, disabling managerial
redirections. If sales are seen flat in one region, customers in adjacent regions may switch
to competitor products; if receivables collections are seen slowing among some
customers, other customers may join them. Investors are likely better served giving
management time and leeway to make improvements, not respond to them on a daily
basis.133
surprise that what is so ubiquitous in our society should affect the financial
reporting of the country's major businesses.
Professor Lowenstein’s comments addressed the traditional disclosure system, not the
kind of transparency digitization injects into discourse. Calls for transparency routinely
are heard concerning business, government, international agencies, military operations,
diplomatic corps, academia and other organization types. See RUPESH A. SHAH, DAVID
F. MURPHY & MALCOLM MCINTOSH, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: CREATING TRUST IN
ORGANISATIONS: STORIES OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE
(2003); Williams, Corporate Social Transparency, supra note 97;see also supra note 2.
131

For a careful assessment of the appeal and limits of transparency, using the example of
corporate voting in the mutual fund industry, see Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting
of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (2003).
132

Quoted in KERMIT L. HALL, ED., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW (2002),
at vii.
133

E.g., Kitch, Theory and Practice, supra note 65, at 847-861 (general analysis
concluding with example of how disclosure concerning Caterpillar Inc. subsidiary in
politically-unstable Brazil could have exacerbated political risks); Jonathan R. Macey &
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If the new rules under Sarbanes-Oxley only tinker with mandatory continuous
display, consider a proposal for pure transparency made by a senior SEC official.134 It
prescribes changing the existing financial reporting environment using two devices: (1)
requiring companies to report real-time bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible
Web sites (including real-time journal entries, ledger summaries, monthly aggregations
and so on) and (2) requiring management to respond publicly to questions concerning this
information.
The theory of this substantive transparency (not mere disclosure) is to equip
investors having requisite interest and resources to perform their own financial statement
audits of companies, or engage their own auditor to do so. Apart from numerous other
practical problems,135 it is doubtful that such deep transparency is in the best interests of
corporations or investors.136 But the proposal shows the enormous new emphasis placed
on transparency, not just disclosure.
2. Auditing’s New Early Warning System — A parallel transparency urge appears
in recent auditing reforms. In traditional financial statement audits, auditors speak as of a
Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990) (explaining how managerial withholding of
information may benefit investors rather than harm them as often assumed).
134

Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An
Alternative to the ‘Independent’ Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347
(2004) [hereinafter, Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence]. When Mr. Chan’s article
was published, he was Associate Regional Director, Enforcement, in the SEC’s Midwest
Regional Office. (His views, of course, do not necessarily represent those of the SEC.)
135

As examples: (1) supplied information is raw bookkeeping data and limited
questionnaire access to management; neither investors nor their auditors have access to a
company’s system of internal control, audit committees, walk-through exercises, or other
essential resources used in traditional auditing and (2) the result would require enormous
investor coordination and/or result in numerous separate investor-audits, generating
wasteful duplicative costs.

136

See Udo C. Brändle & Jürgen Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked Corporation?,
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=523102 (2004) (making the specific case
against utter transparency in corporate financial reporting); see generally Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) (expressing more general reservations);
Elizabeth J. Boros, Corporations Online, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L. ___ (2001) (survey of
100 large Australian companies documents grounds for skepticism as to using corporate
Web sites to deliver “universal real-time free access to continuous disclosure
information”). This concern is wholly apart from protecting proprietary information that
would necessarily be covered by such a proposal. See Chan, supra note 134, at 391-92.
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moment in time about financial statements prepared as of a prior date and for a prior
period, providing hard facts. These are attestations of numerical history. Auditors are
financial archeologists. They provide three paragraphs of standardized text to express
unqualified opinions, and offer a few additional sentences in other situations.
Reforms implemented in mid-2004 vastly expand the auditor’s task, transforming
it from financial archeologist of numerical history into a financial forecaster addressed to
narrative prognosis. The reform requires auditors to test and opine upon a company’s
internal control over financial reporting.137 The goal is to provide financial statement
users with information concerning financial statement reliability.
Though based upon a current examination and providing an opinion about control
maintenance during a past accounting period, it is quintessentially about the future—the
auditing standard describes itself as creating an “early warning system.”138 The early
warnings are to be provided using elaborate narrative disclosure provided by the auditor.
When no warning is required, the standard form of auditor opinion on control will be akin
to the standard three boilerplate paragraphs of the traditional auditor opinion on financial
statements; in other situations, the vehicle will go well beyond a few additional
sentences.
The key trigger requiring auditor forward-looking narrative disclosure is the
existence of a material weakness in such control. The concept of material weakness is
forward-looking, defined as risk that material misstatements will not be detected or
prevented. The auditing standard requires auditors to describe material weaknesses along
with their actual or potential future effects on the company’s financial statements.
The control audit promotes transparency in the financial reporting process. It may
be useful as an antidote to widespread preoccupation with the future seen creating
demand and supply for phony financial futures. On the other hand, its likely
effectiveness must be evaluated by comparison to the kindred system of forward-looking
disclosure in place for business substance since the 1980s. At a minimum, to make this
system meaningful likely will require the same kinds of safe harbor concepts developed
for the forward-looking disclosure system.139 Even those, of course, produced
imperfections in the relation between forward narrative and eventual reporting of
numerical history. Analogous challenges appear in this control audit innovation.
137

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD
NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004) [hereinafter
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2].
138

AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 137, ¶ 6.

139

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System:
Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L. J. ___
(forthcoming 2004).
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C. Finance Theory’s Role
The evolution of accounting from numerical history to narrative prognosis is
visibly driven by market demand; less visible is the force of theory. The most powerful
theory driving accounting’s world in the past thirty years is modern finance theory. Its
key concept is the efficient market hypothesis. Under it, all historical information,
including accounting data, is rapidly impounded into stock price.140 Moreover, under this
hypothesis, all publicly-available information is accurately interpreted no matter how or
where it is presented. These hypotheses—widely believed—imply that any effort to
improve accounting theory or practice is meaningless. Finance theory’s contribution to
accounting is thus its retardation.141
First, efficiency theory says the form of presenting accounting information does
not matter. If so, there is no point searching for an ideal form. If identical data can be
put in the balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, footnotes, or MD&A and
generate the same interpretation and result on price, promoting accounting quality is
valueless. The disincentives to develop superior accounting are enormous.142
Second, efficiency theory says accounting information is instantly useless.
Struggles become moot about fidelity in the balance sheet or income statement, about
FIFO versus LIFO, about historical cost versus fair value or accrual versus cash. It even
would moot—extraordinarily—questions about whether to account for stock options as
an expense on the income statement!143

140

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (still the leading statement by leading corporate law scholars
on market efficiency despite many critiques).
141

Cf. Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (1994).
142

Cf. Thomas A. Downes & Thomas R. Dyckman, A Critical Look at the Efficient
Market Empirical Research Literature as it Relates to Accounting Information, 48 ACCT.
REV. 300 (1973).
143

A leading columnist for the Wall Street Journal argues that it doesn't matter whether
one accounts for stock options or not, for the market will figure out their significance
without regard to accounting. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Much Ado About Stock Options,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at A23:
In the real world [sic], any information, as long as it's deemed relevant,
will be processed into the mill for pricing securities. It doesn't matter
whether the data is computed into the income statement or appears in a
footnote or is shouted up and down Wall Street by a man in a tutu.
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Third, efficiency theory says market price responds to cash flow effects of
managerial decisions and policy, not to the effect on reported earnings per share.
Companies should therefore never seek to manage earnings; investors see through it. If
so, accounting need not develop tools to discourage or detect such massage.144 It won’t
happen.145
Efficiency theory is presentiation.146 Presentiate is "[t]o make or render present in
place or time; to cause to be perceived or realized as present."147 In efficiency theory, all
numerical history is absorbed into current stock price and becomes instantly irrelevant;
all that matters is the future and this too gets “discounted” into price. This model of
presentiation is theology. Yet its enormous power has retarded accounting as numerical
history and reoriented financial reporting to a forward-looking, less reliable, fraudtempting emphasis on narrative prognosis.
Finance has thus been the foe of accounting, at least as traditional numerical
history. Part II’s examples of the fair-value movement and cash-flow elevation are
products of finance theory’s force. On the other hand, despite finance theory’s
predictions, managers do manipulate accounting forms and markets are fooled.148 A
144

See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG.
813, 819 (2003) (“Under efficient market analysis, no regulation of accounting is
needed”).
145

E.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 73, at 372 (“there are no financial illusions”).
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The chief contribution of this concept to legal literature was made in respect of
criticism of the classical theory of contracts which appeared to hold a conceit that
contract formation achieved the reduction of future events to present control. See Ian R.
Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589
(1974). Professor Macneil explained the concept:
Presentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the
effect of the future on the present. It is a recognition that the course of the
future is so unalterably bound by present conditions that the future has
been brought effectively into the present so that it may be dealt with just
as if it were in fact the present. Thus, the presentiation of a transaction
involves restricting its expected future effects to those defined in the
present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 863
(1978) (footnote omitted).
147

8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1306 (1933).

148

A dramatic large-scale example is the tele-com industry’s capitalizing of line costs that
kept their stock prices high; they plummeted when it became clear these should have
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burgeoning literature drawing upon behavioral finance undercuts modern finance theory
and explains why.149 A key concept is frame dependence, a bias to apprehend
information differently according to how it is presented. The relation to accounting
forms is clear. It can matter whether stock options are listed as expenses in the income
statement or included in footnote disclosure.150 Attention to accounting as numerical
history remains important and its transformation into narrative prognosis not the
inexorable march of progress.
The difficulty with behavioral challenges to efficiency theory is their inherent
messiness, contrasted with the elegant beauty of efficient markets. Behavioral theories
explain a wide range of often conflicting biases whereas efficiency theory assumes a
market behaving as if all actors were purely rational. In fact, however, both accounts of
market behavior may be partially correct, producing a middle ground.
Markets may be substantially efficient, but prone to periodic bouts of moodiness
better captured by behavioral theories. Such bouts appear to have characterized the late
1990s and early 2000s and their associated financial frauds.151 If so, this experience
suggests that accounting forms matter most when they are least likely to be obeyed.
Numerical history is thus particularly important during innovative periods such as the late

been expensed. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003)
(providing description of the largest frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s, including in
the tele-com industry). Another example is how investors responded to different
accounting for acquisitions under the now-repealed purchase-pooling distinction. See
Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston & Michael F. Peters, Purchase, Pooling and
Equity Analysts’ Valuation, ACCOUNTING REVIEW (July 2000).
149

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546
(1994) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using chaos theory and noise theory);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using noise theory and
prospect theory).
150

Numerous other examples appear. Consider America-On-Line’s (AOL’s) decision
whether to capitalize or expense disbursements to build its Internet subscriber data base.
AOL capitalized these; the market price reflected this; when AOL changed under
pressure to expense these costs, the market price reflected the change. Consider the
general practice in the tele-com industry of treating capacity swaps as asset and revenue
transactions rather than as liability and expense transactions. See supra note 148.
151

See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2002); see also ANDREI SCHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKET S (2001).
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1990s and early 2000s when market appetites for narrative prognosis peak. In this
middle ground, reliable accounting is a central piston in the efficient market engine.152

CONCLUSION
Accounting is best when conceived as numerical history, though even this
conception faces limits. So conceived, a mix of rules and principles constituting
generally accepted accounting practice furnishes a fair presentation of historical financial
performance resulting in a current financial circumstance. Attempting to move the
numerical system to provide information of a forward-looking character is formidable.
Narrative is essential. Narration can be even more limited, however, when used as
prognostication. Forward-looking information is inherently more likely to disappoint than
historical data. In the best of worlds, the latter is what it is, while the former is what
people’s expectations and hopes determine it to mean.
The digitized-information age demands from accounting what it cannot reliably
deliver. Debates focusing on rules versus principles or GAAP versus fair presentations
miss these points. Reforms directed towards enhancing the orientation toward the future
not only miss the points but exacerbate what they miss. Accounting must walk before it
can run. Inherent limits suggest at most capacity for a rapid crawl. The horse is out of
the gate, however, not to be yoked; the challenge is to look forward in accounting reform
as much as market demand looks forward in its appetite for information obscured in
cloudy crystal balls. One solution is to curtail the scope of forward-looking disclosure,
replacing earnings forecasts with warnings of material risks of adverse developments.
This Article does not end on a false dichotomy but appreciates the need for
accounting as both numerical history and narrative prognosis.153 It warns, however, that
the optimal mix likely weighs more heavily on its qualities as numerical history than
narrative prognosis. One lesson from late 1990s/early 2000’s accounting frauds is the
balance tipped the wrong way. Feeding the beast of digitized and information-hungry
culture must be accompanied with training it.154 Mankind has long dreamt of knowing
152

See Calvin Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 637
(1997).

153

See supra note 84 (noting role of prognosis in traditional accounting as numerical
history).
154

It is ironic that digitization poses such challenges for accounting understood as
numerical history. After all, digitization is the process of transforming information
(including narrative and graphic displays) into codes expressed in numbers (0 and 1) to
facilitate computer processing and electronic transfer. Words-into-numbers sounds like
accounting; for accounting, however, digitization resulted in numbers-into-words.
Compare Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Valuation: Geography and Semiotics, 55 SMU L.
REV. 197, 224 (2002) (meditation on ascendancy of numbers over letters amid
digitization).
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tomorrow’s news today and digitized culture whets that appetite because it seems so
much more within reach. In accounting and securities regulation, however, hunger for
tomorrow’s news today can be perilous.155 Caveat culture.

155

Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (insider trading conviction arising
from Wall Street Journal columnist privately and criminally sharing tomorrow’s news
today).
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